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Copyright Royalty Regulation and  
Competition in the Music Retail Market† 
By YONG HYEON YANG* 
Price control can restore efficiency in some cases, but an uncarefully 
designed policy fails to restore efficiency, yields side effects, or even 
exacerbates efficiency losses. This paper shows that the copyright 
royalty rule, which takes the greater of ad valorem royalties and per-
unit royalties, tends to fix the prices of final goods at a specific level. 
Such a rule weakens competition as it prevents prices from decreasing 
even when market conditions change, having negative effects on social 
welfare as well as consumer surplus. Counterfactual analyses using 
estimation results in the Korean online music service industry show 
that firms could have profitably reduced prices if the ad valorem rule 
had been applied instead, although they did not have an incentive to 
do so under the original combination rule. 
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  I. Introduction 
 
rice control is known to cause deadweight losses in general, as the transaction 
volume cannot reach the socially optimal level. On the other hand, there are 
some cases in which price control can restore efficiency, such as under a natural 
monopoly, for public goods, and/or when externalities exist. For these reasons, the 
Korean government tries to control price in many industries. However, in some 
cases, an uncarefully designed policy fails to restore efficiency, yields side effects, 
or even exacerbates efficiency losses. For instance, Cho (2014) and Cho (2015) 
show that price control in the book sales industry has a negative impact on social 
welfare. 
This paper investigates the Korean online music service industry, showing that 
copyright royalty rules used to be designed to fix the price of the final good at a 
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specific level, which weakens competition as it prevents prices from decreasing 
even when market conditions change. Copyright royalties are set by copyright trust 
management associations, but must be approved by the government. The purpose 
of the regulation is to keep the royalties from increasing above a reasonable level, 
as excessively high royalties would suppress the efficient use of creative works. 
Copyright trust management associations are granted a monopoly power in the 
copyright market and therefore have an incentive to set monopoly prices if not 
regulated. An ideal regulation for this purpose would be a price cap so that the 
royalties cannot exceed a certain level. 
In practice, the Ministry of Culture, Sports and Tourism determines copyright 
royalties by itself, which is the strongest version of royalty regulation. The 
government claims that it tries to balance between copyright holders and 
consumers. The government, however, does not have competitiveness in choosing 
efficient price levels compared to the private sector. Therefore, it needs to refrain 
from choosing copyright royalties by itself. Instead, it can contribute by not 
approving anticompetitive copyright royalty rules submitted by copyright trust 
management associations. In other words, the government needs to compare the 
submitted rules with the existing rules and reject a submittal if the former are more 
anticompetitive than the latter. It can advise, but not force, copyright trust 
management associations to change their rules in a less anticompetitive manner. 
The Ministry of Culture, Sports and Tourism used to do the opposite by 
employing anticompetitive copyright royalty rules by itself. More specifically, the 
royalties are set proportional to prices of final goods (ad valorem), but are 
guaranteed at a minimum amount (per-unit). This paper shows that such a rule 
yields lower consumer surplus as well as lower overall surplus. As the actual 
royalties are determined at the maximum of ad valorem and per-unit royalties (the 
combination rule, hereafter), firms are inclined to stick to the price level at which 
the two rules give the same royalties. This occurs because firms must pay more 
royalties when raising prices but the same royalties when lowering prices, and thus 
will not change their prices in the event of a marginal shock. Price stickiness yields 
a less efficient volume of transactions in some cases, which leads to lower 
consumer surplus. A theoretical analysis in Section 3 shows that the equilibrium 
price would be lower if the ad valorem rule applies instead, so the transaction 
volume, consumer surplus, and overall surplus are smaller under the combination 
rule. 
Real-world data confirm the above argument. The combination rule was applied 
to all products in the online music service industry by the end of 2012, and it is 
currently applied only to streaming services. Prices were mostly set at a level that 
equates per-unit royalties with ad valorem royalties in 2012, but differences began 
to appear in 2013. Counterfactual analyses using estimation results in Section 4 
show that firms could have profitably reduced prices if the ad valorem rule had 
been applied, although they did not have an incentive to do so under the 
combination rule. 
This paper is organized as follows. The next section provides an overview of 
how copyright royalties are determined in the Korean music industry, and discusses 
anticompetitiveness of the rules related to these processes. Section 3 shows 
theoretical results that the combination rule causes firms with different cost 
INSIDabcdef_:MS_0001MS_0001
IN
SI
D
ab
cd
ef
_:
M
S_
00
01
M
S_
00
01
VOL. 39 NO. 1           Copyright Royalty Regulation and Competition in the Music Retail Market  85 
structures to choose identical prices and that the combination rule is dominated by 
the ad valorem rule in terms of social welfare. In Section 4, counterfactual analyses 
support the theoretical results by showing that the equilibrium price would have 
been lower under the ad valorem rule. A demand function is estimated using a 
random utility model for this purpose. Section 5 concludes the paper. 
 
II. Copyright Royalty Rules for Music in Korea 
 
Copyright royalty rules are made by copyright trust management associations. 
There are four associations who operate copyright trust management businesses in 
the Korean music industry. The Korea Music Copyright Association (KOMCA) 
and the Korean Society of Composers, Authors, and Publishers (KOSCAP) manage 
the copyrights of composers and authors. The Federation of Korean Music 
Performers (FKMP) manages performers’ copyrights, and the Recording Industry 
Association of Korea (RIAK) manages music record producers’ copyrights. There 
are other institutions who manage copyrights on behalf of copyright holders; these 
are known as copyright agency and brokerage business operators. A critical 
difference between copyright trust management businesses and other copyright 
management businesses is that copyright royalties received by the former must be 
approved by the Minister of Culture, Sports and Tourism. Article 105, Paragraph 
(5) of the Copyright Act states that: 
 
“ ··· the rate and amount of usage fee ··· shall be determined by the 
copyright management service provider after he/she obtains approval 
from the Minister of Culture, Sports and Tourism: provided, that the 
same shall not apply to the person who has reported on the copyright 
agency and brokerage business.” 
 
The reason why copyright trust management associations must obtain approval 
from the government is that the associations have market power which allows them 
to set copyright royalties at an excessively high level. If copyright royalties are too 
high, fair use of creative works will be hampered, leading to fewer transactions 
than the socially optimal level. As collective management of copyrights was 
introduced to foster the efficient use of creative works by reducing transaction 
costs, it is reasonable to restrain copyright trust management associations from 
setting copyright royalties too high. One rationale behind such a government 
intervention would be that the government grants a monopoly right to the 
associations and therefore has a duty to keep prices at reasonable levels. Although 
non-governmental agencies can take over such responsibilities, the government 
determines copyright royalties in many countries, akin to the Copyright Royalty 
Board in the United States. 
A distinct feature of the Korean system is that the government can change 
copyright royalty rules even against the intent of copyright trust management 
associations. Article 105, Paragraphs (6) and (8) of the Copyright Act state: 
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“(6) As for approval under paragraph (5), the Minister of Culture, 
Sports and Tourism ··· may approve after specifying a period of time or 
correcting the content in the application if necessary.” 
“(8) Where it is necessary ···, the Minister of Culture, Sports and 
Tourism may change the content of approval pursuant to the 
provisions of paragraph (5).” 
 
Although it is necessary to control copyright royalties, this does not mean that 
the government needs to set the royalty level. The only role that the government 
has to play is to supervise the system and to reject applications which attempt 
excessive increases in copyright royalties. The government appears to intervene by 
taking a more regulatory approach in Korea than is required. Such an intervention 
occasionally has an unintended impact on the market, as noted by Rhee and Yoon 
(2014). 
Another feature of the Korean government intervening too excessively is that the 
government attempts to control the prices of final goods in the online music service 
industry. Prices are controlled via the copyright royalty rules approved by the 
government, which may cause firms to choose the same prices. For example, the 
current copyright royalty rules of KOMCA for streaming services are as follows:1 
 
“Article 23. (On-Demand Streaming Services) (1) The copyright royalty 
for streaming services of music is determined by the following if 
consumers pay in proportion to the number of streaming times. 
1.4 won × the number of streaming times × the management ratio2 
(2) The copyright royalty for streaming services of music is determined 
by the greater of the following two if consumers pay a monthly fee 
regardless of the number of streaming times. 
(i) 0.7 won × the number of streaming times × the management ratio 
(ii) sales volume × 10% × the management ratio” 
 
Two ways to calculate copyright royalties are presented in Article 23, Paragraph 
(2). The first (i) is the per-unit rule: users pay in proportion to the number of 
transactions. The second (ii) is the ad valorem rule: users pay in proportion to the 
price of the good. The copyright royalty rules for streaming services combine these 
two rules, setting copyright royalties at the greater of the two. I call it the 
combination rule. Using the combination rule causes online service providers 
(OSPs) to set the price of streaming services at the level which makes the per-unit 
royalties coincide with the ad valorem royalties. This occurs because OSPs face a 
different incentive structure when increasing prices from when decreasing prices. 
At the price where the per-unit rule and the ad valorem rule give identical 
copyright royalties, OSPs pay more royalties when raising prices, but the same 
amount of royalties when cutting prices. Thus, OSPs would not deviate from the 
price level in the event of a small shock. A deeper analysis will be provided in the   
 
1The copyright royalty rules of FKMP and RIAK are described in a similar way. 
2The management ratio is the ratio of music copyrights that KOMCA manages on behalf of composers and 
authors. 
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TABLE 1—PRICES OF SELECTED PRODUCTS ACROSS OSPS (SEP 2016) 
(UNIT: 1,000 WON) 
 Melon KT 
music 
Genie  
music 
Soribada Bugs Mnet 
Unlimited streaming  8.4  7.0  6.0  8.4  7.9  7.4 
Monthly rent 11.4  9.0  7.0  –  9.9 10.4 
Download 30 files  9.5  9.0  6.0  9.4  8.9  9.4 
Download 100 files 20.5 18.0  9.0 20.4 19.9 20.4 
Download 30 files and unlimited streaming 13.5 11.0  9.0 11.4 10.9 11.4 
Download 100 files and unlimited streaming 24.5 20.0 12.0 22.4 21.9 22.4 
Source: websites of OSPs. 
 
next section. 
In fact, the copyright royalty rules for streaming services had been even worse 
before they were revised in March of 2013. In the former version, copyright 
royalties were based on the number of consumers and not on the number of 
streaming times, and KOMCA set the royalties for streaming services at 400 won 
or 10% of the price of the good per consumer, whichever was greater. Before the 
revision, prices showed little dispersion across OSPs, ranging from 5,500 won to 
6,000 won, but in September of 2016, prices ranged from 6,000 won to 8,400 won 
across OSPs, as can be seen in Table 1. 
The effect of replacing the combination rule by other rules can be identified by 
observing changes in the prices of the products other than streaming services. The 
prices of those products were nearly identical across OSPs when the combination 
rule was applied to them. Currently there is some variation across OSPs as the per-
unit rule is applied. For example, the price for on-demand download services of 40 
music files was 5,000 won per month for all the OSPs by the end of 2012, but in 
September of 2016, download services of 30 music files are sold at 6,000 won to 
9,500 won depending on the OSP.3  There are discount offers as well, and 
consumers can even buy the same services at 3,900 won.4 In fact, if consumers 
download 30 files, the copyright royalties paid to copyright holders exceed the 
price of the services, as 180 won must be paid per download in total. But OSPs 
know by experience that consumers typically do not exhaust their download 
options; thus, they can charge as little as 3,900 won for their services. Changing 
copyright royalty rules must have affected competition between OSPs. 
 
III. Theoretical Analysis 
 
This section shows that a combination of the ad valorem rule and the per-unit 
rule causes firms to freeze prices under changing circumstances. 
 
  
 
3The download services of 40 music files were sold by only two OSPs as of September of 2016; hence, there 
is not much variation in the price of this product. 
4Even less expensive promotion opportunities exist, but with some constraints. 
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A. Numerical Example 
 
To illustrate, I begin with a toy model of two firms. To focus on pricing, I 
employ a differentiated product model. Suppose firms 1 and 2 face the following 
demand functions. 
 
1 1 1 2q a p bp    
 
2 2 2 1q a p bp    
 
iq  denotes the demand for firm i ’s product, and ip  denotes its price. Let ir  
denote firm i ’s copyright royalties, which are determined by 
 
 = ,i ir max p u  
 
where  0,  1  is the ad valorem royalty rate and 0u   is the per-unit royalty. 
Assuming that firm i ’s marginal cost ic  is constant, firm i ’s profit is given by 
     [ .]i i i i i ip p c r p q p    Assume firms optimize à la Bertrand competition, 
that is, theyregard each other’s prices as given. Profit maximizing conditions are 
then given by / 0,i id dp   which is 
 
if
1
if
i
i i
i
i i i
cq p u
p
q c u p u


      
 
 
Consequently, there are four possible candidates of equilibria. One is 
 
(1) 
1 1 2
1 1 1 22
2 1 2
2 2 1 22
1
2 1 14
1
2 1 14
c c cbp a a a
b b
c c cbp a a a
b b
 
 
               
               
  
 
when 1p u   and 2 ,p u   and another is 
 
(2) 
   
   
1 1 1 1 2 1 22
2 2 2 1 2 1 22
1 2
2 4
1 2
2 4
bp a c u a a c c u
b b
bp a c u a a c c u
b b
        
        
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FIGURE 1. BEST RESPONSE OF FIRM 1 UNDER DIFFERENT LEVELS OF 1c  WHEN 2 1p    
 
when 1p u   and 2 .p u   The other two cases are omitted as I focus on a 
symmetric example below , but in fact there is only one equilibrium for a reason I 
explain later. 
To see that firms may retain a specific price even when market conditions change, 
suppose 1 2 1,a a  0.5, 0.4,b    and  0.4.u   When 1 2 0.3,c c   the 
equilibrium is characterized by (1), yielding 1 2 1,p p   in which case 
1 2= .p p u    When 1 2 0.1,c c   the equilibrium is characterized by (2), 
yielding 1 2 1,p p   in which case 1 2 .p p u    As costs are in between, that 
is  1 2, 0.1, 0.3 ,c c   (1) yields 1 1p   and 2 1,p   but this violates the 
conditions 1p u   and 2p u   and therefore cannot be an equilibrium. 
Meanwhile, (2) yields 1 1p   and 2 1,p   but this violates the conditions 
1p u   and 2 .p u   Therefore, when  1 2,  0.1,  0.3 ,c c   the only equilibrium 
is always 1 2 1.p p    
To understand why this happens, fix 2 1p   and write 1  in terms of 1p  and 
1c  as 
 
2
1 1 1 1 1
1 1 2
1 1 1 1 1
1.9 0.6 1.5 if 1
,1
0.6 .9 1
( )
.5 if
( )
(0 ) 1
p c p c p
p
p c p c p
      

  
  
 
 
It is easy to see that  1 1,  1p  is concave in 1,p  implying that there is a unique 
1p  that maximizes  1 1 .,  1p  There is a kink in  1 1,  1p  at 1 1,p   and 
 1 0.1,  0.3c   makes 1 1p   maximize  1 1,1 .p  To see this in a graph, define 
     1 1 1 1 1 1 1,1 ,p p r p q p       then      1 1 1 1 1 1,1 ,1lp p c q p    is maximized 
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when, to roughly say,  1 1p  has a slope identical to that of  1 1 1,1 .c q p  Note 
that   21 1 1 11.9 0.6p p p      if 1 1,p  and 21 10.6 0.9p p   if 1 1,p   and 
1 1 1 1( 1. )5c q c p   is a linear function of 1p  with a slope 1.c  As shown in 
Figure 1,  1,1p  is maximized at 1 1p   when  1 0.1,  0.3 .c    
Let us now see how the result changes when the ad valorem rule or the per-unit 
rule is employed. If royalties are determined by rates only, as 1c  and 2c  decrease 
from 0.3 to 0.1, the equilibrium price decreases from 1 to 7/9. The current 
copyright royalty rules prevent firms from lowering prices when marginal costs 
decrease. To see the deadweight loss, the price is higher by 2/9, and the quantities 
sold by two firms are lower by 2/9, indicating that the overall surplus is lower by 
2/81 under the combination rule than under the ad valorem rule. The consumer 
surplus is lower by 20/81 under the combination rule as 1 2 1q q   consumers 
suffer from high prices and the deadweight loss is solely a loss for consumers who 
give up purchasing. 
If royalties are determined by per-unit only, as 1c  and 2c  increase from 0.1 to 
0.3, the equilibrium price increases from 1 to 17/15. The overall surplus is higher 
under the combination rule than under the per-unit rule in this case, but the 
situation is opposite as costs rise. For example, suppose 1 2 0.7.c c   The 
equilibrium price is 1 2 7 / 5p p   under the per-unit rule, but it is 1 2p p   
13/9 under the combination rule. Thus, the overall surplus is higher under the per-
unit rule when costs are high. 
The above illustration shows that using the combination rule makes firms 
reluctant to change their prices. There is a range of marginal costs in which firms 
stick to the same price, which equates ad valorem royalties with per-unit royalties. 
When costs are low, the ad valorem rule yields higher consumer surplus and higher 
overall surplus than the combination rule. When costs are high enough, the per-unit 
rule yields higher consumer surplus and higher overall surplus than the 
combination rule. 
To summarize, the combination rule makes the price of the final good rigid, thus 
lessening competition, and gives lower consumer surplus than the ad valorem rule 
and the per-unit rule under some circumstances. This can be shown in a more 
general context. The following subsection deals with a generalized model. 
 
B. Generalization 
 
Suppose n firms are competing in a differentiated product model. Each firm 
optimizes à la Bertrand competition, that is, each firm regards others’ prices as 
given. Copyright royalties are determined by  ,  ,i ir max p u  and each firm’s 
profit function is given by      .i i i i i ip p c r p q p       Suppose the market is 
in the equilibrium with p  satisfying ip u    for all .i  If firm i is raising its 
price ,ip  its marginal profit would be 
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(3) 
*
* *
* *
*
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ), ( ) ( )lim 1
i i
i i i i i i
i i i
p p i ii i
p p p q p q pq p p c p
p pp p
   
 


          
 
If firm i is reducing its price, its marginal profit would be 
 
(4) 
*
* *
* *
*
( ) ( ) (, ( ) ( )lim ) ( )
i i
i i i i i i
i i
p p i ii i
p p p q p q pq p p c u
p pp p
  

         
 
Note that ;ip u    accordingly, it is clear that5 
 
* ** *
, ,lim li( ) ) ( )m( ( )
i i i i
i i i i i i i i
p p p pi i i i
p p p p p p
p p p p
       
 
    
 
This implies that firms may not want to change their prices even when a demand 
shift or a supply shock arises. In particular, firms would not change their prices in 
the event of a marginal shock if and only if 
 
(5) 
* ** *
, ,lim 0( ) ( ) ( )li ( )m
i i i i
i i i i i i i i
p p p pi i i i
p p p p p p
p p p p
       
 
     
The above can be summarized by the following proposition.6 
 
Proposition 1:   2 / / 0.i i i jj iq p q p     Suppose the demand  q p  is given, satisfying   
{ , -},i iby r max p uIf copyright royalties are determined there exists a non singleton set
* .ip p u of cost profiles c under which all firms choose such that   
 
The above proposition implies that firms with different production costs may 
choose the same price. This can be verified from the actual data. Figure 2 shows 
the price dispersion of six products across five online service providers (OSPs) 
from January of 2012 to June of 2014. The six products were sold during the 
overall data period. The price dispersion is measured by the standard deviation of 
the price divided by the mean of the price. Five out of the six products show no 
price dispersion in 2012, in which year the combination rule was applied to all 
products. Those products were priced exactly at the level which equates ad valorem 
royalties with per-unit royalties. For example, the price of streaming services was 
 
5This shows why there exists a unique equilibrium. Given p−i, πi is concave in pi in the region of  pi < ip

as 
well as in the region  pi > .ip

 At the kink, the right derivative of the profit function is less than its left derivative, 
so πi is universally concave in pi. This implies that firm i’s best response is uniquely defined by a function of p−i. 
6Equivalently, the proposition can be rewritten that given costs, there exists a non-singleton set of demand 
functions under which firms choose p*, or even that there exists a non-singleton set of cost profiles and demand 
functions. 
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FIGURE 2. PRICE DISPERSION OF SIX PRODUCTS FROM FIVE OSPS 
 
3,000 won in 2012, and royalties were the greater of 150 won and 5% of the price 
to composers and authors, the greater of 75 won and 2.5% of the price to 
performers, and the greater of 1,050 won and 35% of the price to music record 
producers. Download services of 40 songs were priced at 5,000 won in 2012, and 
royalties were the greater of 410 won and 8.2% of the price to composers and 
authors, and similarly determined to other copyright holders. 
It seems, however, that OSPs had different cost structures in that the price 
dispersion increases in January of 2013, i.e., as soon as the revised copyright 
royalty rules became effective. The combination rule was substituted by the per-
unit rule for all the products except for streaming services, after which OSPs began 
to set different prices for the same product, implying differences in profit 
maximization conditions. Therefore it is suspected that OSPs chose the same price 
in 2012 even though their marginal costs were different.7 
Interestingly, the price dispersion of streaming services also increased though the 
combination rule was maintained for streaming services. In fact, the prices of 
streaming services increased far beyond the level where ad valorem royalties meet 
per-unit royalties. As the prices of other products rose due to increases in copyright 
royalties for them, OSPs increased the prices of streaming services as well. The 
price of streaming services was set around 6,000 won and not at 4,000 won which 
makes ad valorem royalties and per-unit royalties identical.8 Consequently, only 
 
7Alternatively, OSPs may have faced different demand functions, which also leads them to choose different 
prices under the per-unit rule. 
8Copyright royalties for streaming services were 400 won to composers and authors, or 10% of the price if greater 
than 400 won, and they were similarly determined to other copyright holders in 2013. 
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the ad valorem rule was applied to determine copyright royalties, so it seems that 
prices were set differently across OSPs, reflecting differences in cost structures. 
One may wonder about the welfare effect when the combination rule is replaced 
by the per-unit rule, or by the ad valorem rule. As the actual data indicate that 
prices of all products increased as soon as the per-unit rule went into effect in 2013, 
it is reasonable to ask whether increases in prices resulted from the adoption of the 
per-unit rule. If the combination rule causes firms to choose identical prices but at a 
lower level than the per-unit rule, or the ad valorem rule, consumers may prefer the 
combination rule to the per-unit rule and the ad valorem rule. The answer is that 
prices went up due to increased royalties rather than the adoption of the per-unit 
rule. For example, the price for download services of 40 songs increased from 
5,000 won in 2012 to approximately 6,900 won in 2013, and royalties for it 
increased from 2,635 won to 4,558 won. It is necessary to see how prices would 
have changed if royalties had not increased. 
The numerical example discussed in the previous subsection provides a clue. 
When the combination rule is replaced by the per-unit rule, prices may increase or 
decrease. Hence, the welfare effect is ambiguous in this case. When the ad valorem 
rule replaces the combination rule, prices decrease and consumers are better off in 
the previous numerical example. I show that this is always the case below. I begin 
with the case where all the firms choose p  satisfying ip u    under the 
combination rule. To see that consumer surplus is lower under the combination rule 
than under the ad valorem rule, note that the condition under which firms choose 
p  such that ip u    implies 
  
 
, ) ] ( )
0
( ( ) [
lim
i i
i i i i i i i i
p p ii i p p
p p p p c p q p
pp p
  

 

  
       
 
As the marginal profit is negative at ip
  under the ad valorem rule, firms would 
choose a lower price at equilibrium. As the price is lower, the equilibrium quantity 
is greater, so consumer surplus will be higher under the ad valorem rule. 
A similar argument can be made with regard to the case where firms do not 
choose .p  When firms’ costs are high, the combination rule yields the same 
equilibrium with the ad valorem rule, and thus prices and consumer surplus are the 
same under both rules as well. When costs are low, prices will be low so that firms 
need to pay per-unit royalties under the combination rule, greater than ad valorem 
royalties, and thus prices are higher under the combination rule. Consumer surplus 
is weakly lower under the combination rule, as prices are always weakly higher. The 
following proposition describes this result. 
 
Proposition 2: The equilibrium price cannot be lower under the combination rule than under 
the ad valorem rule. Hence, consumer surplus cannot be higher under the combination rule than 
under the ad valorem rule. 
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Proof Let ci  and ai  denote firm i’s profit function under the combination 
rule and under the ad valorem rule, respectively. Also let cp  and ap  denote the 
equilibrium price under the combination rule and under the ad valorem rule, 
respectively. When ,cp u   it is clear that .c ap p  When cp u   with 
equality holding for some i, those firms with cip u   have 
 
 
,( ( ) [ ] )
0 ,
()
lim
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ci i
c c
i i i i i i i i
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p p ii i p p
p p p p c p q p
pp p
  
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       
 
so c ai ip p  for those firms. The other firms will also set no lower price as 
competing firms set higher prices, which implies .c ap p  When cp u   with 
equality holding for some i, those firms with cip u   have 
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so c ai ip p  for those firms. The other firms with cjp u   have 
 
[ ] ( ) [ ] (
0 ,
)
c c
j j j j j j j
j jp p p p
p c u q p p c p q p
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where the last inequality holds given that (3) is less than (4), even when .cjp u   
Accordingly, c aj jp p  as well. When cip u   for some i and cjp u   for some 
,j  the above argument applies as well, and thus .c ap p                 
 
Between the ad valorem rule and the per-unit rule, one does not dominate the 
other. When costs are high, the ad valorem rule yields the same equilibrium with 
the combination rule, and thus higher prices than the per-unit rule in some cases. 
When costs are low, the ad valorem rule yields lower prices than the combination 
rule which yields lower prices than the per-unit rule.  
The above discussion implies that the combination rule tends to maintain prices 
at a higher level. This would benefit producers to the detriment of consumers. 
Copyright holders may benefit by earning more royalties but by sacrificing 
consumer surplus. There exists a deadweight loss as the transaction volume is 
lower than the socially optimal level. Therefore, employing the combination rule to 
determine copyright royalties should be avoided. I suggest the use of the ad 
valorem rule, as it is always better in terms of overall surplus. 
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IV. Empirical Tests 
 
In this section, I empirically test the hypothesis that the combination rule 
prevents online service providers (OSPs) from changing prices. A straightforward 
way to prove it would be to see whether the cost structures of OSPs fall into the 
range in which price stickiness arises. More specifically, it suffices to see whether 
the cost structures satisfy (5). Unfortunately, I could not obtain supply side data, 
meaning that cost structures cannot be estimated. As an alternative method, I 
calculate changes in the profits of OSPs upon a marginal change in the price. (5) is 
satisfied if OSPs’ profits decrease both when the price increases and when it 
decreases. To do this, I first estimate a demand function using the actual data. Then 
I predict market shares as if OSPs change the prices of their products, and calculate 
changes in profits to see that price is indeed sticky. Moreover, by comparing 
changes in profits to those under the counterfactual situation where only the ad 
valorem rule applies, I show that the combination rule restrained OSPs, which 
would have lowered prices under the ad valorem rule, from doing so. 
 
A. Data 
 
Data are monthly, spanning from January of 2012 to June of 2014, and contain 
sales data from five OSPs (Melon, KT music, Soribada, Bugs, and CJ E&M). Data 
are obtained from several sources. Listed prices, the average discount rate, and the 
number of consumers of each product were obtained for Melon and KT Music with 
the help of the Ministry of Culture, Sports and Tourism. The actual usage data 
(downloads, streaming) of each product were obtained from KOMCA, FKMP, and 
RIAK for the five OSPs for the entire period. The number of consumers of each 
product was obtained from FKMP and RIAK for the five OSPs for a subset of the 
data period. The characteristics of each product were obtained at the website of 
each OSP. 
To estimate a demand function, the number of consumers or the market share of 
each product is necessary. I do not have this information for the entire period and 
therefore extrapolated the variable to the former and the later period. Specifically, 
as I have the number of consumers for all the products from June of 2012 to April 
of 2013, I calculated the average number of streaming times per consumer for 
streaming services from June of 2012 to October of 2012 and divided the number 
of streaming times by the average number of streaming times per consumer to 
obtain the extrapolated number of consumers for streaming services from January 
of 2012 to May of 2012. To obtain the number for May of 2013 to June of 2014, I 
used the average number of streaming times from December of 2012 to April of 
2013. Here, I implicitly assumed that the average number of streaming times 
remained stable during the data period. There is some variation in the average 
number of streaming times, but the volatility is not high since the maximum to 
minimum ratio is less than 1.3. For download-only products, the number of 
download times was used. The data from FKMP and that from KOMCA do not 
coincide exactly, but the difference was only within 1% of the magnitude of the 
variables. I used data from FKMP mostly, as it includes the number of consumers. 
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B. Demand Estimation 
 
A random utility model with a logit error is used to estimate the demand 
function. I adopt the estimation methodology of Berry (1994), which begins with 
an indirect utility function 
 
,ij j x p j j iju x p        
 
which is the utility that consumer i  obtains from purchasing product j  with 
observable characteristics ,jx  price ,jp  and unobserved quality .j ij R  is 
an idiosyncratic utility term that i  has for j  in addition to , ,  .j j jx p and   
ij  follows a type-I extreme value distribution. There are products from the five 
OSPs and an outside option. An outside option is denoted by product 0, and its utility 
is normalized to 0 0;i iu   that is 0 0.   The market share of product 0, ,j      
n  is calculated by 
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and especially 
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Therefore, 
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( )j j x p j j
s
exp x p
s
      
 
and taking the log gives 
 
0log logj j x p j js s x p       
 
This equation is used for the estimation. It is assumed that 0,|j jE x     but 
0.j jE p     Consequently, a two-stage least squares (2SLS) estimation is 
conducted using instrumental variables. Following Berry et al. (1995), the average 
characteristics of the other products of the same OSP, and the average 
characteristics of the products of the competing OSPs were used as instrumental 
variables for the price. These variables are closely related to prices, as prices are 
determined through competition among products but would not be correlated with   
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TABLE 2—ESTIMATION RESULTS 
Variables OLS 
w/o trend 
2SLS 
w/o trend 
OLS 
w/ trend 
2SLS 
w/ trend 
Price (1,000 won)  
(SE) 
−0.2902∗∗∗ 
(0.025) 
−0.3355∗∗∗ 
(0.0317) 
−0.3436∗∗∗ 
(0.0313) 
−0.5384∗∗∗ 
(0.0497) 
download  
(SE) 
0.002801 
(0.001599) 
0.005313∗∗ 
(0.001930) 
0.005913∗∗ 
(0.001938) 
0.01692∗∗∗ 
(0.002922) 
Monthly rent dummy 
(SE) 
1.5738∗∗∗ 
(0.1636) 
1.7160∗∗∗ 
(0.1743) 
1.7811∗∗∗ 
(0.1788) 
2.4456∗∗∗ 
(0.2231) 
Streaming dummy  
(SE) 
1.2229∗∗∗ 
(0.1057) 
1.3317∗∗∗ 
(0.1155) 
1.3648∗∗∗ 
(0.1167) 
1.8510∗∗∗ 
(0.1520) 
trend  
(SE) 
  0.01751∗∗ 
(0.006188) 
0.04077∗∗∗ 
(0.007751) 
OSP dummies  
adjusted R2 
included  
0.5091 
included  
0.5108 
included  
0.5115 
included  
0.5014 
Note: *** indicates significant at the 0.1% level, ** at the 1% level, and * at the 5% level. 
 
unobserved quality. 
Estimation results are given in Table 2. The price coefficient is negatively 
significant in all the settings, but the 2SLS method gives bias-corrected estimates. 
The results are consistent with the theory that the coefficient estimate may be 
positively biased under OLS when the variable is positively correlated with error 
terms. The coefficients of the observed characteristics are positively significant in 
the two 2SLS estimation results. The model is estimated with a trend variable 
excluded and included. Given the increase in the total number of consumers over 
the data period, it can be regarded as reasonable to include a trend variable. Indeed, 
the coefficient of the trend variable is estimated to be significant and positive. On 
the other hand, it is also reasonable to let the unobserved quality j  capture the 
increase in the attractiveness of products over time, as a trend variable is not a 
characteristic of products and does not precisely capture an increase in 
attractiveness although they are correlated. The adjusted 2R  is greater for the 
second column without a trend variable as compared to that in the fourth column. 
For this reason, I perform a counterfactual analysis using both results: one from the 
second column, and the other from the fourth column. 
 
C. Counterfactual Analysis 
 
A counterfactual analysis is carried out as follows. I first change the price of 
streaming services, to see if such a deviation is profitable to OSPs. If it is not for 
both an increase and a decrease in the price, price is proven to be sticky. I then 
apply a different copyright royalty rule to see if such a deviation would have been 
profitable. If this is the case, it proves that the combination rule prevented OSPs 
from changing prices, which would have occurred under a different rule. 
December of 2013 is chosen as the base period, as most products are sold around 
that month. The number of products doubled in January of 2013 when the new 
copyright royalty rule became effective, and KT Music stopped selling two 
products in August of 2013 and one product in June of 2014. When new products 
are introduced or when certain products exit a market, the demand for those    
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TABLE 3—CHANGES IN PROFITS WHEN  
THE PRICE OF STREAMING SERVICES DECREASES BY 1% 
 ∆ profit under the combination rule ∆ profit under the ad valorem rule 
OSP streaming services all products streaming services all products 
CJ E&M −0.17% −0.18% 1.77% 1.04% 
Melon −0.91% −1.70% 1.37% 0.56% 
KT music 0.58% 0.46% 2.13% 1.73% 
Bugs 0.55% 0.07% 2.17% 0.34% 
Soribada 0.69% 0.18% 2.24% 0.59% 
Note: The estimation result with a trend variable was used for a counterfactual analysis. 
 
products may not be stable. Hence, I use the data from December of 2013 for a 
counterfactual analysis to see the price effect when the market condition is 
relatively stable. 
I focus on streaming services because the combination rule was applied only to 
streaming services in December of 2013. Other products were charged royalties by 
the per-unit rule, which does not dominate, nor is dominated by, the combination 
rule as discussed in the previous section. Copyright royalties for streaming services 
were the greater of 3.6 won per streaming and 60% of the price in total in 
December of 2013, effective from May of 2013. Although this type of combination 
rule does not limit setting prices of final goods as much as the combination rule 
discussed above, the government revised the copyright royalty rule considering that 
the price of streaming services was mostly 6,000 won in 2013, and that the average 
number of streaming times per consumer is 1,000 times.9 Therefore, those OSPs 
which set the prices of streaming services at 6,000 won paid 3,600 won for 
copyright royalties in either case and therefore were effectively restrained by the 
combination rule. 
Table 3 summarizes the results of a counterfactual analysis using the estimation 
result with a trend variable. The cases of CJ E&M and Melon prove that they 
would have profitably lowered prices under the ad valorem rule. If CJ E&M cut the 
price of its streaming services by 1%, its profit from streaming services decreases 
by 0.17%, but if the ad valorem rule had been applied, the profit would have 
increased by 1.77%. As prices drop, demand for this product increases by 2.80%, 
and revenue from it increases by 1.77%, but copyright royalties increase by 2.80%, 
a growth rate identical to that of demand, under the combination rule.10 However, 
if the ad valorem rule had been applied, copyright royalties would have increased 
only by 1.77%, a growth rate identical to that of revenue. Therefore, cutting prices 
would have led to greater profits for CJ E&M. While reducing the price of 
streaming services leads to decreases in sales of other products and thus decreases 
in profits from those products as well, the total profit would have increased by 
1.04% under the ad valorem rule. A similar argument applies to Melon’s case as 
well. 
When KT music reduces the price of streaming services, however, its profit turns 
out to increase under the combination rule. A decrease in the price of streaming 
 
9See the press release by the Ministry of Culture, Sports and Tourism on March 18th, 2013. 
10Here, I implicitly assume that OSPs do not incur more costs when they serve an additional 3% of 
consumers. If they do incur more costs, the decrease in price would reduce the profit under the combination rule 
by a greater amount. 
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TABLE 4—CHANGES IN PROFITS WHEN  
THE PRICE OF STREAMING SERVICES INCREASES BY 1% 
 ∆ profit under the combination rule ∆ profit under the ad valorem rule 
OSP streaming services all products streaming services all products 
CJ E&M  0.09%  0.13% −1.76% −1.03% 
Melon  0.80%  1.61% −1.37% −0.57% 
KT music −2.10% −1.70% −2.10% −1.70% 
Bugs −0.62% −0.08% −2.13% −0.34% 
Soribada −2.20% −0.58% −2.20% −0.58% 
Note: The estimation result with a trend variable was used for a counterfactual analysis. 
 
TABLE 5—CHANGES IN THE TOTAL PROFIT WHEN  
THE PRICE OF STREAMING SERVICES CHANGES BY 1% 
 ∆ profit when price decreases ∆ profit when price increases 
OSP Combination Ad valorem Combination Ad valorem 
CJ E&M −0.77% 0.41%  0.72% −0.41% 
Melon −2.04% 0.09%  1.98% −0.10% 
KT Music −0.50% 0.76% −0.76% −0.76% 
Bugs −0.12% 0.15%  0.11% −0.15% 
Soribada −0.14% 0.26% −0.26% −0.26% 
Note: The estimation result without a trend variable was used for a counterfactual analysis. 
 
services by 1% leads to an increase in its profit from streaming services by 0.58%, 
and an increase in the total profit by 0.46%.11 One possibility is that OSPs 
colluded to earn more profit.12 OSPs may earn more profit by cutting prices alone 
but earn less profit by reducing prices together. Indeed, when all of the OSPs cut 
the prices of streaming services by 1%, all of them lose profits. Under the ad 
valorem rule, however, some OSPs would have earned more profit even if all of the 
OSPs reduced the prices of their streaming services by 1%. Such a deviation would 
have increased Melon’s profit by 0.21%, KT Music’s by 1.05%, and CJ E&M’s by 
0.45%. Therefore, these OSPs have an incentive to deviate from collusion. 
Table 4 shows whether OSPs have an incentive to increase their prices of 
streaming services. Under the combination rule, some OSPs have an incentive to 
increase prices, but no OSP does under the ad valorem rule. Comparing Table 3 
with Table 4, it is interesting to note that under the combination rule, the magnitude 
of the price effect is different when prices decrease from when prices increase, 
especially in the cases of KT Music and Soribada. This proves that the combination 
rule presents OSPs with a different incentive structure when raising prices as 
opposed to when lowering price. This is not the case under the ad valorem rule, as 
the effect of a price decrease is nearly identical in terms of magnitude but only 
opposite in direction relative to that of a price increase for all the OSPs. 
Table 5 summarizes the results of a counterfactual analysis using the estimation 
result without a trend variable. Reducing the price is not profitable for any OSP 
under the combination rule, but is profitable for all the OSPs under the ad valorem 
rule. Therefore, this result reinforces the claim that the combination rule prevented 
 
11If the ad valorem rule had been applied, the increase in the total profit would have been 1.73%, so it can be 
claimed that the ad valorem rule pushes KT Music harder to reduce prices than the combination rule. 
12Another possibility is that the assumption of no additional cost fails, so KT Music indeed earns less 
considering an increase in costs. 
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OSPs from reducing prices, which would have occurred if the ad valorem rule had 
been in force. For KT Music and Soribada, raising prices as well as reducing prices 
is unprofitable under the combination rule, which satisfies (5). This proves again 
that the combination rule causes some OSPs to keep their price level at 6,000 won, 
which equates ad valorem royalties with per-unit royalties. On the other hand, CJ 
E&M, Melon and Bugs set their prices of streaming services at less than 6,000 
won, which is why (5) is not satisfied in those cases. In fact, they are tempted to 
raise prices under the combination rule, which implies that the combination rule 
causes OSPs to choose identical prices, i.e., those which make ad valorem royalties 
and per-unit royalties equal. 
  
V. Concluding Remarks 
 
Price control may have side effects that firms retain the current price level even 
when market conditions change. A combination of the ad valorem and the per-unit 
copyright royalty rules is a weak version of price control. This paper shows that the 
combination rule makes firms inclined to choose a specific price level, which 
equates ad valorem royalties with per-unit royalties. It is also shown that the 
equilibrium price is no lower and overall surplus (as well as consumer surplus) is 
no larger under the combination rule than under the ad valorem rule. A 
counterfactual analysis implies that some online service providers (OSPs) in the 
online music service industry would have reduced price if the ad valorem rule had 
been applied, which is consistent with a theoretical prediction. Thus, employing the 
combination rule weakens competition. 
The combination rule may also be exploited for tacit collusion. Firms may 
implicitly agree not to deviate from a specific price level in order to earn more 
profits together, even when a unilateral deviation would be profitable. One of the 
counterfactual analyses shows that some OSPs could have profitably deviated to a 
lower price level, given that the indirect utility function is correctly specified. One 
possible reason why they did not do so is that they had an incentive to hold prices 
steady, as they would have earned less if all the OSPs had lowered prices. The 
problem is that such tacit collusion is difficult to detect, as choosing such a price is 
in the competition equilibrium in many cases under the combination rule. 
Obtaining data would be the most challenging part with regard to detection, but 
even if the data are available, it would be difficult to prove that firms implicitly 
colluded in all the possible scenarios. Indeed, using a different specification for the 
indirect utility function in the above counterfactual analysis justifies the pricing 
behavior of OSPs as competitive, as the price is in the Bertrand competition 
equilibrium. 
To summarize, the combination rule by itself causes firms to set prices at higher 
levels, thus reducing consumer surplus, and this may be exploited by way of tacit 
collusion in some cases. Therefore, replacing the combination rule with the ad 
valorem rule is strongly recommended. In the online music service industry, the 
combination rule is currently not applied to most products, but only a weak version 
of the combination rule is applied to streaming services. I have two remarks for the 
copyright royalty rule policy in this matter. 
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First, it would promote competition to switch to the ad valorem rule for 
streaming services. Copyright holders and their associations have an objection to 
switching to the ad valorem rule, as they are worried about the possibility that 
some OSPs such as Apple music may cut prices aggressively to attract more 
consumers. The government should not consider their concerns too much, keeping 
in mind that using the combination rule may harm consumers. If minimum per-unit 
royalties need to be specified in order to avoid abuse by OSPs, they must be 
determined at a low level that is not binding in most cases. 
Second, bringing the combination rule back to other products must be avoided. 
The per-unit rule is mostly applied to other products according to the current 
copyright royalty rules. Copyright holders want to apply the combination rule that 
would give more royalties when prices increase. For instance, they argued that the 
minimum rate provision must be restored when it was removed in June of 2012. 
Although the combination rule is not worse than the per-unit rule in terms of 
overall surplus, as proven above, bringing the combination rule back would clearly 
be worse than switching to the ad valorem rule. Thus, the government can retain 
the current per-unit rule or alternatively switch to the ad valorem rule, but should 
not restore the combination rule. 
A remark pertaining to the welfare of copyright holders is in order. As claimed in 
the introduction, the government should make a decision in terms of 
anticompetitiveness rather than balance between copyright holders and consumers. 
In evaluating anticompetitiveness, however, it is necessary to consider the dynamic 
effects of copyright royalties that stimulate the production of creative works. When 
copyright holders are able to earn more royalties, they would create more art 
products, which in turn increases consumer welfare. Therefore, if the combination 
rule gives copyright holders more royalties, there can be a positive dynamic effect 
that might be considered. Incorporating the dynamic effect into the model would 
not only complicate the analysis much but also make the result sensitive to 
assumptions, so I leave it to a future research topic. 
One thing to note, however, is that copyright holders may not be better off under 
the combination rule than under the ad valorem rule. Royalties per transaction are 
higher, but the transaction volume is lower under the combination rule, so the 
effect on the total amount of royalties earned by copyright holders is ambiguous. 
More assumptions are necessary for an accurate analysis of how much each 
stakeholder, including copyright holders, will be affected by changes in copyright 
royalty rules. Measurement of the effect on each stakeholder would help the 
government make policy decisions. This is left as a future research topic. 
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